Épistéme y Dóxa en Platón. La Naturaleza del Conocimiento, una Aproximación desde Menón

Plato’s Meno is a key text for epistemology because it inaugurates a debate on the nature of knowledge. The dialogue introduces the theory of reminiscence (ἀνάμνησις) and links the inquiry into ἀρετή (virtue) with the problem of how we come to know. After several failed attempts to define virtue, Plato opens the possibility of a kind of a posteriori knowing: δόξα as true opinion (ὀρθὴ δόξα), which arises from experience and can adequately guide action. Alongside it appears ἐπιστήμη, a form of knowledge characterized by the certainty afforded by causal reasoning (αἰτίᾳ λογισμῷ). The distinction between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη does not hinge on their dealing with different objects, but on the firmness of their results: δόξα is unstable, whereas ἐπιστήμη is stable, demonstrative, and capable of being “tethered” by an account of the cause. Within this framework, the dialogue explores whether virtue can be taught—a question closely tied to the kind of knowledge that underwrites it. The essay adopts a hermeneutic perspective to analyze the correlation and divergences between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα in the Meno, to clarify their scope within Plato’s theory of knowledge, and to assess their relevance for understanding moral education and the status of knowing.